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AN EXCEPTION TO JESNER: PREVENTING U.S.
CORPORATIONS AND THEIR SUBSIDIARIES FROM
AVOIDING LIABILITY FOR HARMS CAUSED ABROAD
INTRODUCTION
In the mid-1990s, the Union Oil Company of California (Unocal) partnered
with Total S.A. and the government and military of Myanmar to extract and
transport natural gas from the Yadana gas field.1 Unocal established two whollyowned subsidiaries in Myanmar to hold its interest in the project.2 Local
villagers alleged that the Myanmar military—which provided security and built
structures (such as helipads) for the project—used forced labor in connection
with the project.3 Other villagers claimed that the military subjected them to
murder, rape, and torture to ensure compliance among conscripted workers.4 The
villagers brought claims in the United States under the Alien Tort Statute
alleging that Unocal, through its foreign subsidiaries, aided and abetted the
military in the crimes in Myanmar.5 Following an extended journey through the
courts, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Unocal could be liable under
the Alien Tort Statute and remanded the case to the district court for further
proceedings.6 Unocal settled with the villagers in 2003.7
In 2018, the U.S. Supreme Court in Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC held that no
foreign corporation may be sued under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS).8 The
Supreme Court also recently held in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co. that the
ATS includes a “presumption against extraterritoriality,” limiting claims to
those that “touch and concern” the United States.9 Together, these holdings
greatly limit the reach of the ATS, including in the case described above.
The ATS is a jurisdictional statute providing noncitizens subject matter
jurisdiction in federal district court for actions in tort alleging violations of “the

1

Doe v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 937 (9th Cir. 2002), vacated, reh’g, en banc, 395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir.

2003).
2
3
4
5
6
7

Unocal, 395 F.3d at 937.
Id. at 939.
Id. at 939–40.
Id.
Id. at 962–63.
Doe v. Unocal, EARTH RTS. INT’L, https://earthrights.org/case/doe-v-unocal/ (last visited Feb. 12,

2019).
8
9

28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1948); Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386 (2018).
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 569 U.S. 108 (2013).
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law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”10 The ATS was little used for
many years following its passage in 1789.11 However, following Filártiga v.
Peña-Irala, decided in 1980, the number of suits involving the ATS quickly
increased.12 By the early 2000s, the Supreme Court began to limit the application
of the ATS.13 Suits limiting the ATS include Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, Kiobel,
and most recently, Jesner.14 Following Kiobel and Jesner, the ATS includes a
“presumption against extraterritorial application,” and no suits may be brought
against foreign corporate defendants.15 These barriers greatly limit the ability of
victims of human rights violations to find justice. Critically, the barriers imposed
by Kiobel and Jesner mean that any human rights violations that occur abroad
will have to significantly “touch and concern” the United States for a suit to
invoke proper jurisdiction—even with an American defendant—and no abuses
by foreign corporations can be tried under the statute.16 This Comment argues
that either the courts or Congress should create an exception under the ATS for
foreign corporate subsidiaries of domestic corporations. This exception would
help realize one goal the ATS was originally enacted to achieve: to find
Americans (or in this case, the entities they control) liable for acts committed
abroad in violation of the law of nations.17 Such an exception will help improve

10

28 U.S.C § 1350.
Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1397.
12
See id. at 1398; Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
13
Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1398.
14
Id. at 1386; Kiobel, 569 U.S. 108; Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
15
Jesner, 138 S. Ct. 1386; Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 125.
16
Jesner, 138 S. Ct. 1386; Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 124–25. It is not entirely clear what conduct satisfies the
“touch and concern” requirement in Kiobel. However, it is clear that if “all relevant conduct [takes] place outside
the United States,” mere corporate presence is insufficient to establish jurisdiction. Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 124–25.
17
Gwynne L. Skinner, Beyond Kiobel: Providing Access to Judicial Remedies for Violations of
International Human Rights Norms by Transnational Business in a New (Post-Kiobel) World, 46 COLUM. HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 158, 189–190 (2014).
11

Many events leading up to the enactment of the ATS involved U.S. citizens violating aliens’
rights . . . . There is also an opinion by the first Attorney General concerning an American who
led a French fleet in attacking and plundering a British slave colony in Sierra Leone. Attorney
General William Bradford’s 1795 opinion clarified that although the United States did not have
criminal jurisdiction over the matter, which he acknowledged was a violation of the law of
nations, the ATS provided federal jurisdiction for a civil remedy against Americans who had
taken part in the attack. Moreover, one of the primary drafters of the First Judiciary Act, William
Paterson, opined that the law of nations provided the substantive law for domestic remedies of
international law violations, using the example of a U.S. citizen enlisting in the British Army to
fight the French in violation of the United States’ position of neutrality . . . . These latter two
examples also demonstrate that the founders were not only concerned with remedying violations
that occurred within the United States, but also with any violation perpetrated against an alien by
a U.S. citizen, even if occurring abroad.
Id.
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American soft power abroad and hold human rights violators liable for their
wrongs.18
Part I of this Comment gives a brief overview of the history of the ATS,
including the reasons for its passage and its interpretation over the first two
centuries of its existence. It also discusses the recent increase in ATS cases along
with the Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence. Part II examines recent ATS
cases involving corporate liability and the path that led to Jesner. Part IV
includes arguments for and against liability for foreign corporations in domestic
courts, both from American and foreign jurisdictions. Part IV also discusses
liability for international law violations in foreign states and the legal theories
used to find liability. Finally, the proposed exception to the holding of Jesner is
set forth in Part III, and Part IV is the conclusion.
I.

ALIEN TORT STATUTE BACKGROUND

The Alien Tort Statute, passed as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, gives
U.S. district courts “original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort
only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States.”19 The ATS is jurisdictional and does not create an independent cause of
action.20 However, “[t]he jurisdictional grant is best read as having been enacted
on the understanding that the common law would provide a cause of action.”21
When the ATS was passed, Congress was “probably” focused on three offenses:
“violation of safe conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and
piracy[,]” which were offenses addressed by the common law of England.22 As
such, the ATS was little used for most of the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries.23 More recently, additional “clear and unambiguous” violations of
international law have been recognized as protected by the ATS.24 The
“recognition . . . that certain acts constituting crimes against humanity are in
violation of basic precepts of international law” led to an increase in ATS
cases.25

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

See infra Section III.A.2.
28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1948); Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724.
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724 (2004).
Id.
Id. at 715 (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *68 (1769)).
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 569 U.S. 108, 114 (2013).
Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1397 (2018).
Id.
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The “modern line of cases” began in 1980 with Filártiga.26 In Filártiga, the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals found there was jurisdiction under the ATS in
a case seeking damages for alleged torture.27
The Supreme Court in Sosa considered whether the ATS can support suits
based on causes of action beyond those considered when the statute was
passed.28 The Court noted that “[f]or two centuries [the Supreme Court has]
affirmed that the domestic law of the United States recognizes the law of
nations.”29 Additionally, the First Congress “assumed that federal courts could
properly identify some international norms as enforceable in the exercise of
§ 1350 [ATS] jurisdiction.”30 The only congressional response to federal courts’
exercise of this judicial power was to explicitly affirm jurisdiction in cases of
torture through the passage of the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991
(TVPA), published as a note to the ATS.31 Additionally, legislative history of
the TVPA “includes the remark that § 1350 should ‘remain intact to permit suits
based on other norms that already exist or may ripen in the future into rules of
customary international law.’”32 Furthermore, “Congress has not in any relevant
way amended § 1350 or limited civil common law power by another statute.”33
Since Sosa, new claims under the ATS are evaluated under the standard that
they must be based on norms “accepted by the civilized world and defined with
a specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms”
recognized at the time the ATS was passed.34 Explaining the level of specificity
required, the Court has held that any new causes of action must be “violations
of international law norms that are ‘specific, universal, and obligatory.’”35

26

Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725.
Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1398 (citing Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980)); Filártiga
v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 887 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that the ATS provides jurisdiction for an act universally
acknowledged as against the law of nations).
28
Sosa, 542 U.S. at 713–14.
29
Id. at 729–730 (citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964) (“[I]t is, of
course, true that United States courts apply international law as a part of our own in appropriate circumstances”);
The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (“International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained
and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction”); The Nereide, 13 U.S. 388, 423 (1815)
(“[T]he Court is bound by the law of nations which is part of the law of the land”)).
30
Id. at 730 (referring to the ATS as 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1948)).
31
Id. at 728.
32
Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 102-367, pt. 1, at 3 (1991)).
33
Id. at 725.
34
Id.
35
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 569 U.S. 108, 117 (2013) (citing Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732 (2004)).
27
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In recent years, the Court has limited the ATS. Perhaps the most notable case
before Jesner is Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co.36 In 2013, the Court ruled on
Kiobel, in which Nigerian nationals sued foreign corporations, alleging the
corporations aided and abetted the Nigerian government’s commission of crimes
against the law of nations in Nigeria.37 In Kiobel, the Court held that any claims
under the ATS must “touch and concern the territory of the United States . . .
with sufficient force to displace the presumption against extraterritorial
application.”38 The presumption against extraterritoriality is that “[w]hen a
statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none.”39
In Kiobel, the Court held that the case could not be maintained when “all the
relevant conduct took place outside the United States,”40 and that “mere
corporate presence” in the United States is insufficient to rebut the presumption
against extraterritoriality.41
The Court did not, in Kiobel, consider whether the ATS provides jurisdiction
for a suit against a corporation.42 It is notable that Kiobel does not bar suits by a
foreign national against foreign corporations.43 The Court instead reached its
holding by requiring that there must be some relevant conduct within the United
States.44
The Court did take this step in Jesner.45 In 2018, the Court barred all suits
by a foreign national against a foreign corporation under the ATS.46 This, in
effect, bars suits against foreign subsidiary corporations of U.S. domestic
corporations, unless there is a case for veil-piercing,47 and the suit is brought
36

See Kiobel, 569 U.S. 108.
Id. at 111–12.
38
Id. at 125.
39
Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010).
40
Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 125.
41
Id. at 133.
42
Id. at 114. Although the Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the question of whether the law
of nations recognizes corporate liability, it did not decide the question. Instead, the Court based its decision on
whether the ATS “allows courts to recognize a cause of action for violations of the law of nations occurring
within the territory of a sovereign other than the United States.” Id.
43
Id. at 124–25 (holding that “mere corporate presence” is not enough to overcome the presumption
against extraterritoriality, but not barring suits against corporations explicitly).
44
Id.
45
Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386 (2018).
46
Id.
47
John H. Matheson, Why Courts Pierce: An Empirical Study of Piercing the Corporate Veil, 7
BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 1 (2010). Business owners (including corporate owners of subsidiaries) generally enjoy
limited liability in relation to their companies’ contracts, torts, and other liabilities. Id. at 3. “Piercing the
corporate veil is a common law legal doctrine used to break rules of traditional limited liability for owners, and
to hold shareholders accountable as though the corporation’s action was the shareholders’ own.” Id. at 4. Veil
piercing is heavily litigated, and there is no clear set of criteria or factors that will lead to a corporation’s veil
37
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directly against the domestic corporation.48 Suits of this type have been largely
unsuccessful.49
II. CORPORATE LIABILITY AND THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE
A. Cases Pre-Jesner
Recently, the courts of appeals have split over whether a corporation is a
suitable defendant in an Alien Tort Statute lawsuit.50 “[T]he Courts of Appeals
for the Seventh, Ninth, and District of Columbia Circuits . . . held that
corporations can be subject to suit under the ATS.”51 Conversely, the Second
Circuit held that the ATS does not apply to corporations at all, but only to natural
persons.52
The Ninth Circuit allowed a suit against a corporation to proceed in Doe v.
Unocal Corp.53 The plaintiff in Doe alleged that the subsidiary of a domestic
corporation aided and abetted human rights abuses in connection with an oil

being pierced. Id. Certain findings from Matheson’s empirical analysis that are particularly relevant are:
Courts pierce twice as often to hold individual persons liable than they do to hold entities . . . .
Entity plaintiffs are almost twice as likely as individual plaintiffs to successfully pierce the
corporate veil. Courts are more likely to pierce to enforce a contract claim than to award recovery
to a tort claimant.
Id. This demonstrates how unlikely it is that a court will pierce the veil in an Alien Tort Statute case. Factors
courts consider when piercing the corporate veil include the presence of fraud/misrepresentation, owner exerting
direct control or dominance over company, owner comingling of funds with the company’s, undercapitalization
of the enterprise, nonfunctioning/nonexistence of directors/officers/managers, principles of fairness, and overlap
between the owner and company (including sharing common offices, business activities, employees, and
officers/directors). Id. at 12–13. While there are relevant trends in veil piercing, as discussed in Matheson’s
article, veil piercing suits are largely unpredictable, and it is an unreliable method to find liability. Id. at 4.
Matheson’s article provides an excellent analysis of when and why courts of different levels pierce the corporate
veil. See generally id.
48
Alert Memorandum, Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton, Supreme Court Rules Foreign Corporations
Not Liable Under Alien Tort Statute 5 (Apr. 25, 2018), https://www.clearygottlieb.com/-/media/files/alertmemos-2018/supreme-court-rules-foreign-corporations-not-liable-under-alien-tort-statute.pdf.
49
Id.
50
See Flomo v. Firestone Nat. Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1017–21 (7th Cir. 2011); Doe I v. Nestle USA,
Inc., 766 F.3d 1013, 1020–22 (9th Cir. 2013); Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 40–55, 397 (D.C.
Cir. 2011), vacated, 527 Fed. Appx. 7 (D.C. Cir. 2013). But see Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 621 F.3d
111, 120 (2d Cir. 2010), aff’d, 569 U.S. 108 (2012).
51
Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1396 (citing Flomo, 643 F.3d at 1017–21; Doe I, 766 F.3d at 1020–22; Doe VIII,
654 F.3d at 40–55).
52
Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1395 (citing Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 120).
53
Doe v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 945–55 (9th Cir. 2002), vacated, reh’g, en banc, 395 F.3d 978
(9th Cir. 2003).

ANDERSON_5.26.20

2020]

5/26/2020 2:56 PM

AN EXCEPTION TO JESNER

1003

project in Myanmar.54 The Ninth Circuit did not consider that Unocal was not
amenable to suit because of its status as a corporation.55 Many more cases
involving plaintiffs suing corporations, which comprised “[the] majority of the
ATS claims filed,” followed the decision of the Ninth Circuit, although most
were settled or failed on other grounds.56
Flomo v. Firestone Nat. Rubber Co. was brought in the Seventh Circuit by
twenty-three Liberian children against Firestone, which, though a subsidiary,
operates a rubber plantation in Liberia.57 The principal issue on appeal was
“whether a corporation or any other entity that is not a natural person . . . can be
liable under the Alien Tort Statute.”58 Judge Posner noted that “[a]ll but one of
the cases at our level hold or assume . . . that corporations can be liable.”59 Judge
Posner discussed historical examples of corporate liability (namely holding
companies criminally liable for complicity in Nazi war crimes) and noted that
“corporate tort liability is common around the world.”60 In sum, the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals is satisfied that the ATS can support corporate
liability.61
Plaintiffs in Doe I v. Nestle USA alleged that Nestle and other corporations
aided and abetted child slavery in the Ivory Coast.62 In its analysis, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals first looked to whether a corporation could be liable
under the ATS.63 The court held that corporations can be liable under the ATS,
54

Unocal, 395 F.3d at 936.
Id. at 945.
56
Jodie A. Kirshner, Why Is the U.S. Abdicating the Policing of Multinational Corporations to Europe?:
Extraterritoriality, Sovereignty, and the Alien Tort Statute, 30 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 259, 274 (2012); see, e.g.,
Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 310 (2d Cir. 2007) (declining to “determine whether the
plaintiffs have adequately pled a violation of international law sufficient to avail themselves of jurisdiction under
the ACTA,” and not reaching the issue of whether a corporation can be liable under the ATS); Am. Isuzu Motors,
Inc. v. Ntsebeza, 128 S. Ct. 2424 (2008); Abdullahi v. Phizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 191 (2d Cir. 2009) (reversing
and remanding district court’s dismissal for lack of ATS jurisdiction; settled for $75 million in 2009);
Chowdhury v. Worldtel Bangl. Holding, Ltd., Case No. 08 Civ. 1659 (BMC), 2009 WL 9053203, 2009 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 131483 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2009) (jury finding defendants liable under the ATS and TVPA), rev’d
in part, aff’d in part, Chowdhury v. Worldtel Bangl. Holding, Ltd., 746 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2014).
57
Flomo v. Firestone Nat. Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013 (7th Cir. 2011).
58
Id. at 1015.
59
Id. at 1017 (citing Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303, 1315 (11th Cir. 2008); Abdullahi, 562
F.3d at 174; Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 550 F.3d 882, 831 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (“The outlier is the split
decision in Kiobel . . . .”); Herero People’s Reparations Corp. v. Deutsche Bank, A.G., 370 F.3d 1192, 1193,
1195 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 226 F.3d 88, 91–92 (2d Cir. 2000); Beanal v. FreeportMcMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161, 163 (5th Cir. 1999).
60
Flomo, 643 F.3d at 1019.
61
Id. at 1021.
62
Doe I v. Nestle USA, 766 F.3d 1013, 1016 (9th Cir. 2014).
63
Id. at 1021.
55
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reaffirming its analysis in Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC.64 This involved a “norm-bynorm analysis of corporate liability.”65 For norms that apply to “states,
individuals, and groups,” the court found that the norm was universal and thus
applicable to corporations.66 The court did not find it necessary that a tribunal
had enforced that norm against a corporation, only that the norm was applicable
to all actors.67 In Doe I, the court concluded “that the prohibition against slavery
is universal and may be asserted against the corporate defendants in this case.”68
The D.C. Circuit also found that corporations can be liable under the ATS in
Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil Corp.69 Citing its own precedent, Herero People’s
Reparations Corp. v. Deutsche Bank, the court found that corporations are not
immune from liability under the ATS.70
The Second Circuit suggested in Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank that
corporations are suitable defendants under the ATS.71 However, the defendants
in that case did not raise the issue, so the court did not specifically decide the
question.72 However, in 2010 the same court found that corporations are not
amenable to suit under ATS.73 In Kiobel, the Second Circuit found that there
must be a norm that corporations are liable under international customary law
for ATS liability to apply.74 As the Second Circuit could not find such a norm,
it held that corporations cannot be liable under the ATS.75
B. Jesner v. Arab Bank
The circuit split discussed in Section III.A led to Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC
reaching the Supreme Court to determine whether the Alien Tort Statute can be
applied to corporations without a specific direction from Congress.76 The Court
64
65
66
67
68
69

Id. (citing Sarei, 550 F.3d at 831).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1022.
Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 2011), vacated, 527 Fed. Appx. 7 (D.C. Cir.

2013).
70

Id. at 57; Herero People’s Reparations Corp. v. Deutsche Bank, A.G., 370 F.3d 1192 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 282–83 (2d Cir. 2007).
72
Khulumani, 504 F.2d at 282–83 (Katzmann, J., concurring)), aff’d, 569 U.S. 108 (2012).
73
Id.
74
Id. at 120.
75
Id.
76
Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1394 (2018) (plurality opinion) (“The question here is
whether the Judiciary has the authority, in an ATS action, to make that determination and then to enforce that
liability [on corporations] in ATS suits, all without any explicit authorization from Congress to do so . . . the
Court must also ask whether it has authority and discretion in an ATS suit to impose liability on a corporation
71
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held in a plurality opinion that foreign corporations are not amenable to suit
under the ATS.77
In Jesner, petitioners brought claims against Arab Bank, a foreign
corporation, for allegedly, through its officials, allowing the bank to be used to
transfer funds to terrorists through its New York City office.78 It was alleged that
these funds were used for terrorist activities that caused death or injury to the
petitioners.79 It was also alleged that the corporation should be liable for
allowing its human agents to use the corporation to violate international law.80
The Court assumed those who committed the acts of terror and those who
“knowingly and purposefully facilitated banking transactions to aid, enable, or
facilitate the terrorist acts would themselves be committing crimes under the
same international-law prohibitions.”81
The plaintiffs in Jesner were 6000 foreign nationals alleging that terrorist
acts committed in the Middle East over a ten-year period injured them or their
family members.82 They alleged that the bank helped finance attacks, allowed
known terrorists and terrorists groups to maintain accounts with the bank, and
“allowed [those] accounts to be used to pay the families of suicide bombers.”83
The defendant was Arab Bank, “a major Jordanian financial institution with
branches throughout the world.”84 Arab Bank accounts for “between one-fifth
and one-third of the total market capitalization of the Amman Stock
Exchange.”85
Jesner reached the Supreme Court on appeal from the Second Circuit.86
Following its ruling in Kiobel, the Second Circuit dismissed In re Arab Bank
(the case which became Jesner on appeal) on its precedent that corporations may
not be sued under the ATS.87

without a specific direction from Congress to do so.”); see also supra Section III.A.
77
Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1403.
78
Id. at 1393.
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
Id. at 1394.
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Id.
85
Id. (quoting Brief for the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at
2, Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386 (2018) (No. 16-499, 2017 WL 3726004, at *2).
86
Id. at 1395.
87
Id. (citing In re Arab Bank, PLC., 808 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 2015)).
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When deciding Jesner, the Supreme Court refused to answer whether
“corporate liability is a question governed by international law or whether
[international] law imposes liability on corporations.”88 However, the Court did
question whether any corporation can be held liable under the ATS, suggesting
that there is no international law norm meeting the “specific, universal, and
obligatory” requirements set out in Sosa necessary to find corporations liable for
international law violations.89 In refusing to answer this question, the Court
suggested it was a question better suited for the political branches to answer.90
Furthermore, the Court questioned whether, under its reading of Sosa, any
new causes of action could be recognized under the ATS.91 Despite these
reservations, throughout its opinion the Court specifically limited the holding of
Jesner to bar suits against only foreign corporations.92
In Jesner, the Court is concerned that if foreign corporations can be held
liable for international law violations under the ATS, then foreign states could
potentially apply the Court’s ruling as a norm of international law to hold U.S.
corporations liable in foreign jurisdictions.93 Recently, other countries have
begun to find that domestic corporations and their foreign subsidiaries are
potentially liable for harms they cause abroad.94 These moves suggest that the
potentially developing norm or trend, if it can be called such, is not to find
entirely foreign corporations liable for harms caused abroad, but to find only
foreign corporate subsidiaries of domestic corporations (and their local parent
corporations) liable.95
There are three concurrences in Jesner by Justices Thomas, Alito, and
Gorsuch.96 Joining in the opinion of the Court, Justice Thomas noted that courts
should not create new causes of action under the ATS, particularly if there is a

88

Id. at 1393.
Id. at 1402 (citing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725 (2004)).
90
Id. at 1402–06.
91
Id. at 1403.
92
Id.
93
Id. at 1405.
94
See Loi 2017-399 du 27 mars 2017 relative au devoir de vigilance des sociétés mères et des entreprises
donneuses d’ordre [Law 2017-339 of March 27, 2017 Relating to the Duty of Care of Parent Companies and
Instructing Companies], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF
FRANCE], Mar. 28, 2017; Choc v. Hudbay Minerals Inc. (2013), 116 O.R. 3d 674, 684 para. 32 (Can. Ont. Super.
Ct. J.); Rb. Den Haag 30 januari 2013, NJF 2013, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2013:BY9854 m.nt. (Akpan/Royal Dutch
Shell PLC) (Neth.); Lungowe v. Vedanta Res. PLC [2017] EWCA (Civ) 1528 (Eng.).
95
See Law 2017-339 of March 27, 2017; Hudbay, 116 O.R. 3d 674; Rb. Den Haag
ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2013:BY9854 (Akpan); Lungowe [2017] EWCA (Civ) 1528.
96
Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1408–19.
89
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risk of international strife.97 Justice Gorsuch was particularly concerned with the
separation of powers principles.98 He highlights that “when confronted with a
request to fashion a new cause of action, ‘separation-of-power principles are or
should be central to the analysis.’”99 Justice Gorsuch discusses the nationality of
the parties and reviews the history of the ATS.100 He finds that, while it is not
stated in the statute, the ATS as originally understood requires an American
defendant for jurisdiction.101 In his concurrence, Justice Alito also noted that
new causes of action should not be created under the ATS because of the
separation-of-powers doctrine.102 Justice Alito went so far as to suggest that the
Court decided Sosa wrongly and that no new causes of action should be created
under the ATS unless they “materially advance the ATS’s objective of avoiding
diplomatic strife.”103
Justice Sotomayor dissented and was joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer,
and Kagan.104 In her dissent, Justice Sotomayor first criticized the plurality for
“fundamentally [misconceiving] how international law works” by asking
whether there is an international law norm for corporate liability.105 Although
Sosa requires international consensus for the existence of a substantive
prohibition, Justice Sotomayor did not find that Sosa demands the same
consensus with regard to the enforcement of those prohibitions, as customary
international law is not directly concerned with the enforcement of violations.106
International law, instead, leaves the remedy for violations of international law
norms to individual states.107
As an example, Justice Sotomayor compared the international law norm of
prohibition of genocide with the “so-called norm” of corporate liability.108 In
Sosa, the Court used the word “norm” when referring to violations.109 A norm,
thus, must be a prohibition that can be violated.110 Justice Sotomayor noted that
it is difficult to violate a norm of corporate liability, and therefore, in her view,
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110

Id. at 1408 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id. at 1413 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
Id. (quoting Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1857 (2017)).
Id. at 1414–19 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
Id. at 1415 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
Id. at 1408 (Alito, J., concurring).
Id. at 1410 (Alito, J., concurring).
Id. at 1419 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 1420 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 1420–21 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1420.
Id.
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this is not the kind of norm that is important under international law.111 Under
Justice Sotomayor’s interpretation, a norm does not consider who can be liable,
but instead refers to an action that is prohibited.112 Committing genocide is an
action, and its prohibition is a norm of international law; the questions of who
can be liable and what is the remedy for the harm are issues for states.113
This same distinction is reflected in the ATS: “[t]he statutory text . . .
requires only that the alleged conduct be specifically and universally condemned
under international law, not that the civil action be of a type that the international
community specifically . . . practices or endorses.”114 Accordingly, Justice
Sotomayor argued that the relevant question was “whether there is any
reason . . . to distinguish between a corporation and a natural person who is
alleged to have violated the law of nations.”115 She concluded that “international
law provides no such reason” for such a distinction, “[n]or does domestic
law.”116 For at least 200 years, under U.S. domestic common law, corporations
have consistently been held liable for actions in tort.117
Justice Sotomayor also highlighted that the ATS clearly limits the class of
plaintiffs but does not do the same for defendants.118 Looking at the rest of the
same section of the Judiciary Act of 1789 as the ATS, she found that Congress
did limit the range of defendants for other types of suits, suggesting that
Congress intentionally did not limit the range of defendants for the ATS.119
Further, the ATS undisputedly establishes jurisdiction over ships for piracy,
which are not natural persons.120 In 1907, “the Attorney General acknowledged
that corporations could be held liable under the ATS.”121
Using language similar to that in Sosa and other Supreme Court precedents,
Justice Sotomayor rebutted the presumption that the ATS was created to be static
and therefore could not allow any new causes of action.122 She pointed to the

111

Id. at 1420–21.
Id. at 1421–22 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
113
Id. at 1420, 1423 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
114
Id. at 1421.
115
Id. at 1425.
116
Id.
117
Id. (citing Phila., Wilmington, & Balt. R.R. v. Quigley, 62 U.S. 202, 210 (1859); Chestnut Hill &
Spring House Tpk. v. Rutter, 4 Serg. & Rawle 6, 17 (Pa. 1818)).
118
Id. at 1426 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
119
Id.
120
Id. at 1427 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
121
Id. at 1426–27 (citing 26 Op. Att’y Gen. 250, 252 (1907)).
122
Id. at 1428 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724 (2004) (“[T]he
reasonable inference from the historical materials is that the statute was intended to have practical effect the
112
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fact that Congress based liability in the ATS on “the law of nations” and “treaties
of the United States,” neither of which are static bodies of law.123
Finally, Justice Sotomayor strongly condemned foreclosing all liability for
foreign corporations.124 She characterized this foreclosure as “us[ing] a
sledgehammer to crack a nut” because other means are available to limit
liability, such as exhaustion doctrine, forum non conveniens, reasons of
international comity, or a State Department request.125 In multiple recent ATS
cases, under two administrations affiliated with different parties (Obama and
Trump), the executive branch has expressly urged the Court to recognize ATS
liability for corporations.126 Justice Sotomayor found it notable that Congress
“has . . . never seen it necessary to immunize corporations . . . even though
corporations have been named as defendants in ATS suits for years.”127 In fact,
two members of Congress (one current and one former) advised the Court
specifically against such a holding.128

moment it became law. The jurisdictional grant is best read as having been enacted on the understanding that
the common law would provide a cause of action . . . .”).
123
Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1427 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1948)).
124
Id. at 1430–31 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
125
Id. (“Courts can also dismiss ATS suits for a plaintiff’s failure to exhaust the remedies available in her
domestic forum.”). Forum non conveniens is a doctrine allowing a court, even with proper jurisdiction, to dismiss
a claim. Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 226 F.3d 88, 100 (2d Cir. 2000). First, courts must determine if an
adequate alternative forum exists. Wiwa, 226 F.3d at 100 (citing Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 254
(1981)). Next, the courts must balance a set of factors “involving the private interests of the parties . . . and any
public interests at stake.” Id. The burden is on the defendant, and “the plaintiff’s choice of forum should rarely
be disturbed.” Id. (quoting Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947)). Factors to be considered include:
access to evidence and witnesses; practical problems including expense; local interest in the dispute;
administrative burden on the court; and the difficultly a court may have in applying foreign laws. Gulf Oil Corp.,
330 U.S. at 508–09.
126
Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1431 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). “This Court should vacate the decision below,
which rests on the mistaken premise that a federal common-law claim under the ATS may never be brought
against a corporation[.]” Id. at 1431 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting Brief for United States as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Neither Party at 5, Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386 (2018) (No. 16-499), 2017 WL
2792284, at *5). “Courts may recognize corporate liability in actions under the ATS as a matter of federal
common law.” Id. at 1431 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioners at 7, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 569 U.S. 108 (2011) (No. 10-1491), 2011 WL
6425363, at *7). “[T]he United States told the Court that it saw no ‘sound reason to categorically exclude
corporate liability’ . . . [and] not providing a remedy against a corporate defendant actually would raise ‘the
possibility of friction[.]’” Id. at 1431 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting Oral Argument at 29, 33, Jesner v.
Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386 (2018) (No. 16-499), 2017 WL 4551614, at *29, 33).
127
Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1431–32 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
128
Id. (citing Brief of U.S. Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse et al. as Amici Curiae at 7–11, Jesner v. Arab Bank,
PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386 (2018) (No. 16-499), 2017 WL 2822776, at *7–11; Brief of Former U.S. Sen. Arlen
Specter et al. as Amici Curiae at 17–18, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 569 U.S. 108 (2011) (Nos. 10-1491,
11-88), 2011 WL 6813568, at *17–18).
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C. How Will These Changes Affect Future Litigations?
One significant impact of Jesner may be that corporations can avoid liability
for violations of international law norms abroad through the use of foreign
subsidiaries.129 Liability of a parent corporation for the actions of its subsidiaries
is rare: the corporate veil is pierced in parent–subsidiary relationships in only
20.56% of cases.130 Corporations already derive significant liability benefits
from parent–subsidiary relationships, severely limiting the ability of victims to
obtain remedies.131 Victims are often faced with considerable hurdles within the
country hosting a subsidiary to find remedies, which is frequently a major reason
why a remedy is sought under the ATS.132
After Kiobel and Jesner, it seems that liability under the ATS for violations
of international law by corporations will only be found if: (1) the corporate
defendant is a domestic U.S. corporation; and (2) any relevant actions violating
international law took place within the United States, thus avoiding Kiobel’s
“presumption against extraterritoriality.”133 As a result, U.S. multinational
corporations will be able to avoid liability in the United States for human rights
violations committed abroad by establishing foreign subsidiary corporations,
which cannot be defendants in ATS litigation.134 Due to technicalities of the
corporate form, domestic corporations will be able to avoid liability even when
subsidiaries are wholly owned by American corporations and share directors and
executives.
It does not seem likely that a foreign corporation being the subsidiary of an
American corporation will satisfy the “touch and concern” requirement of
Kiobel, thus preventing a court from piercing the corporate veil.135 Furthermore,
because of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, it was unlikely
that a litigant could plead sufficient facts prior to discovery to show that a human
rights violation—perpetuated by a subsidiary overseas—touches and concerns
the United States in relation to the parent.136 Jesner will only increase the
existing hurdles to bringing a suit.

129

Alert Memorandum, supra note 48, at 5.
Matheson, supra note 47, at 15; see supra note 47.
131
Gwynne Skinner, Rethinking Limited Liability of Parent Corporations for Foreign Subsidiaries’
Violations of International Human Rights Law, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1769, 1775 (2015); Skinner, supra
note 17, at 163; see also supra note 47.
132
Skinner, supra note 131, at 1800; Skinner, supra note 17, at 163.
133
Jesner, 138 S. Ct. 1386; Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 125, 133.
134
Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1407.
135
Kiobel, 569 U.S. 108.
136
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); see also
130
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The effects of Jesner and other recent ATS cases become apparent when
looking at the case of the Myanmar villagers against Unocal.137 While Unocal is
a domestic U.S. corporation, its subsidiaries are not.138 If Jesner had been the
law at the time, the villagers would have been barred from bringing suit directly
against Unocal’s subsidiaries in Myanmar, even though both subsidiaries are
wholly owned.139 Any suit now must be against the subsidiaries indirectly
through their parent, Unocal.140 After Kiobel, Twombly, and Iqbal, the villagers
would now be required to plead sufficient facts—prior to discovery—that
Unocal took actions violating international law in the United States.141 Only then
would the villagers be able to move to pierce the corporate veil to find the
subsidiaries liable for their actions.
III. ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST JURISDICTION
Many arguments have been made against ATS liability.142 These arguments
are centered around foreign relations, hindrance to foreign investment, the
sanctity of corporate limited liability, and the political questions raised by ATS
suits.143 However, allowing ATS liability could, in fact, be a benefit for both
foreign relations and foreign investment. In particular, by allowing ATS suits,
the United States could increase its soft power and influence by holding human
rights violators responsible for their actions. Part III aims to dissect the various
policy reasons behind the arguments for and against jurisdiction. Section III.A
discusses potential foreign relations implications of ATS lawsuits. Section III.B
assesses the impacts on foreign investment. Finally, Section III.C addresses the
Christine P. Bartholomew, Twiqbal in Context, 65 J. LEGAL EDU. 744 (2016); David N. Anthony & Timothy J.
St. George, “Plausibility” Pleading After Twombly and Iqbal, PRAC. LITIGATOR, July 2010, at 9. The cases
Twombly and Iqbal had a significant impact on pleading requirements. Together, these cases create a plausibility
standard based on the context of the case. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663–64 (“Determining whether a complaint
states a plausible claim is context-specific, requiring the reviewing court to draw on its experience and common
sense.”). “Post-Iqbal there is arguably a need for allegations closer to the level of ‘proof’ previously reserved
for summary judgment.” Bartholomew, supra, at 753. Claimants must plead “enough facts to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. A complaint must “plead sufficient factual content
to allow the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct.”
Anthony & St. George, supra, at 10. In cases where a defendant is seeking to fulfill the touch-and-concern
requirement of Kiobel, it will be very difficult to plead sufficient facts, as much of the information may be
proprietary and held by the companies themselves.
137
Doe v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002).
138
Id.
139
See Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386 (2018); Unocal, 395 F.3d 932.
140
See Jesner, 138 S. Ct. 1386.
141
See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 569 U.S. 108 (2013); Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662; Twombly, 550 U.S.
544.
142
See, e.g., Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1405–08.
143
See id.
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political question doctrine and whether defining corporate ATS liability is the
job of the courts or Congress.
Courts and legislatures in other jurisdictions have considered these
questions. Recent cases in foreign jurisdictions have suggested that their courts
may be more amenable than U.S. Courts to hearing cases based on the actions
of a domestic corporation abroad, a foreign corporation, or a domestic
corporation’s foreign subsidiaries.144 Since at least 2012, some scholars suggest
that the European Union is growing more tolerant of claims based on foreign
acts, while “the United States is growing less tolerant of extraterritorial
adjudication.”145 Countries including France, England, Canada, and the
Netherlands have used various theories of liability for hearing cases arising
extraterritorially.146 It is notable that in the cases discussed below, all of the
alleged tortious actions took place in a foreign country.
A. Foreign Relations
1. Foreign Protests of ATS Suits
A major criticism of ATS lawsuits is that lawsuits against foreign defendants
give rise to diplomatic strife.147 In Jesner, for example, Jordan objected on the
grounds that the litigation was an affront to its sovereignty.148 In numerous cases
alleging that corporations participated in or abetted apartheid in South Africa,
the South African government objected on the basis that those cases were
interfering with its Truth and Reconciliation Commission.149 In a suit against a
mining company, Papua New Guinea objected on the grounds that “the litigation
had ‘potentially very serious social, economic, legal, political and security
implications’ for Papua New Guinea and would impair its relations with the
United States.”150 Other countries such as the United Kingdom, Switzerland, and
144
See Choc v. Hudbay Minerals Inc. (2013), 116 O.R. 3d 674 (Can. Ont. Super. Ct. J.); Rb. Den Haag 30
januari 2013, NFJ 2013, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2013:BY9854 m.nt. (Akpan/Royal Dutch Shell PLC) (Neth.);
Lungowe v. Vedanta Res. PLC [2017] EWCA (Civ) 1528 (Eng.).
145
Kirshner, supra note 56.
146
See Loi 2017-399 du 27 mars 2017 relative au devoir de vigilance des sociétés mères et des entreprises
donneuses d’ordre [Law 2017-339 of March 27, 2017 Relating to the Duty of Care of Parent Companies and
Instructing Companies], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF
FRANCE], Mar. 28, 2017; Hudbay, 116 O.R. 3d 674; Rb. Den Haag ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2013:BY9854 (Akpan);
Lungowe [2017] EWCA (Civ) 1528.
147
Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1398.
148
Id. at 1407.
149
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 733 n.21 (2004).
150
Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 77–78 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting in
part) (citing Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 487 F.3d 1193, 1199 (9th Cir. 2007)), vacated, 527 Fed. Appx. 7 (D.C.
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Germany “have complained that the ATS improperly interferes with their rights
to regulate their citizens and conduct in their own territory.”151 This was a major
concern of the Court when deciding Kiobel, and the Court again recognized this
concern when deciding Jesner.152
In her dissent in Jesner, Justice Sotomayor recognized that “none of those
objections [were] about the availability of corporate liability as a general
matter.”153 This suggests that there is nothing inherently offensive to other states
in finding a corporation liable for human rights violations. Protesters—including
the European Commission, South Africa, Germany, and the United Kingdom—
were concerned instead about exhaustion of foreign remedies, interference with
internal judicial process, and suits by foreign plaintiffs against foreign
defendants for conduct taking place entirely on foreign soil.154 Furthermore,
governments objecting to ATS litigation may change course depending on the
local administration in power.155 For example, in South Africa, after the Mbeki
Administration objected to ATS litigation as an infringement on the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission’s work, the next administration, led by Joseph
Zuma, “reversed course and supported . . . ATS litigation.”156
There is a concern that plaintiffs will sue under the ATS using an aiding and
abetting theory to “use corporations as surrogate defendants to challenge the
conduct of foreign governments.”157 While this may be a valid concern, it could
be limited by the political question doctrine—especially when the country in
question is an ally of the United States.158 Additionally, as suggested by Justice
Cir. 2013).
151
Doe VIII, 654 F.3d at 78.
152
Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1398; Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 569 U.S. 108, 124 (2013).
153
Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1430 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
154
Id.
155
Robert Knowles, A Realist Defense of the Alien Tort Statute, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1117, 1162 (2011).
156
Id. (citing Letter from Jeffrey Thamsanqa Radebe, Minister of Justice & Constitutional Dev., S. Afr.,
to the Honorable Shira Scheindlin, U.S. Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of N.Y., available at https://viewfromll2.files.
wordpress.com/2009/12/radebeletter.pdf).
157
Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1404.
158
Political question doctrine tells us that the courts should not adjudicate claims involving “policy choices
and value determinations constitutionally committed for resolution to the halls of Congress or the confines of
the Executive Branch.” Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986). The case Baker
v. Carr set out a series of factors used to determine whether a claim constitutes a political question. 369 U.S.
186, 217 (1962). Some relevant factors include:
the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for
nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution
without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government . . . or the
potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one
question.
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Sotomayor, State Department requests—or simple reasons of international
comity—could be a means to limit liability when it is necessary.159
Other countries, such as France, England, Canada, and the Netherlands, have
begun to develop their own theories of liability, demonstrating that there is not
universal resistance to finding corporations, or their subsidiaries, liable for their
actions abroad.160 These countries follow three broad rationales for liability: due
diligence in France, duty of care in England and Canada, and the plurality of the
defendants doctrine in the Netherlands.161
France has followed a due diligence approach, recently enacting a bill that
“create[s] a presumption of parent company liability for subsidiaries’ torts
abroad that the parent corporations can overcome if they engage in human rights
‘due diligence’ regarding acts of those subsidiaries.”162 A similar law is under
consideration by the Swiss Parliament.163 The French law establishes a statutory
duty of care for parent companies with regard to their subsidiaries’ actions.164
The law sets out certain actions that satisfy the due diligence requirement and
overcome the presumption of liability.165 Parent companies are required to
evaluate the risk for violations; enact procedures for regular monitoring and
evaluation of subsidiaries, subcontractors, and suppliers; and take actions to
mitigate risks or prevent serious harm.166 If they cannot rebut liability, parent
companies are liable to “repair the damage that the performance of those
obligations would have prevented.”167

Id.
159

Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1430–31 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
See Loi 2017-399 du 27 mars 2017 relative au devoir de vigilance des sociétésmères et des entreprises
donneuses d’ordre [Law 2017-339 of March 27, 2017 Relating to the Duty of Care of Parent Companies and
Instructing Companies], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF
FRANCE], Mar. 28, 2017; Choc v. Hudbay Minerals Inc. (2013), 116 O.R. 3d 674 (Can. Ont. Super. Ct. J.); Rb.
Den Haag 30 januari 2013, NJF 2013, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2013:BY9854 m.nt. (Akpan/Royal Dutch Shell PLC)
(Neth.); Lungowe v. Vedanta Res. PLC [2017] EWCA (Civ) 1528 (Eng.).
161
See Law 2017-339 of March 27, 2017; Hudbay, 116 O.R. 3d 674; Rb. Den Haag
ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2013:BY9854 (Akpan); Lungowe [2017] EWCA (Civ) 1528.
162
Skinner, supra note 131, at 1826; Law 2017-339 of March 27, 2017; see also Skinner, supra note 17,
at 260.
163
Dalia Palombo, Parent Company Liability for Human Rights Abuses in the UK? We Need Clarity,
OXFORD HUM. RTS. HUB (July 24, 2018), http://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/parent-company-liability-for-human-rightsabuses-in-the-uk-we-need-clarity.
164
Law 2017-339 of March 27, 2017; Skinner, supra note 17, at 260–61; Skinner, supra note 131, at 1826.
165
Law 2017-339 of March 27, 2017.
166
Id.
167
Id.
160
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Similarly, courts in England and Canada have begun to use a duty of care
analysis when considering the liability of a domestic parent for actions of a
foreign corporate subsidiary.168 In both countries, cases are currently proceeding
against domestic corporations for the actions of their subsidiaries.169
In England, the Lungowe v. Vedanta Res. PLC litigation has been ongoing
since 2015.170 Zambian citizens brought a suit against the U.K. corporation,
Vedanta Resources, and against its subsidiary in Zambia, KCM.171 KCM, owned
primarily by Vedanta Resource Holdings Limited, operates the Nchanga mines
in Zambia.172 Significantly, while Vedanta owns 79.42% of KCM, the
Government of Zambia holds the remaining 20.58%.173 The claimants filed suit
against Vedanta and KCM, alleging personal injury, damage to property, loss of
income, and loss of amenity and enjoyment of land arising out of alleged
pollution and environmental damage caused by the Nchanga copper mines.174
KCM is being sued directly for “causes of action in negligence, nuisance, the
rule in Rylands v. Fletcher, trespass, and liability under the Zambian statutes.”175
Meanwhile, the claim against Vedanta is for negligence in its duty of care to
ensure KCM’s operations did not harm local communities.176 Plaintiffs allege
Vedanta had a duty of care because of the high level of control it exercised over
its subsidiary, KCM.177
Vedanta filed an unsuccessful motion claiming that the court lacked
jurisdiction, reasoning that jurisdiction should not be found in a case in which
“non-EU claimants are using the existence of the claim against an EU domiciled
party as a device to ensure that their real claim, against another defendant, is
litigated in this jurisdiction rather than in the natural forum.”178 Defendants
Vedanta and KCM claimed that the entire focus of the lawsuit is in Zambia and

168
See Lungowe v. Vedanta Res. PLC [2017] EWCA (Civ) 1528 (Eng.); Choc v. Hudbay Minerals Inc.
(2013), 116 O.R. 3d 674 (Can. Ont. Super. Ct. J.).
169
See Lungowe [2017] EWCA (Civ) 1528; Hudbay, 116 O.R. 3d 674.
170
Lungowe [2017] EWCA (Civ) 1528 [1].
171
Id.
172
Id. [10]–[11].
173
Id. See infra Section III.A.2.
174
Lungowe v. Vedanta Res. PLC [2016] EWHC (TCC) 975 [1] (Eng.).
175
Lungowe [2017] EWCA (Civ) 1528 [26]; Rylands v. Fletcher [1868] UKHL 1, (1868) 3 LRE & I. App.
(HL) 330 (appeal taken from Eng.) (UK) (“The person who, for his own purposes, brings on his land and collects
and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it at his peril; and if he does not do so, is
prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape.”).
176
Lungowe [2017] EWCA (Civ) 1528 [20].
177
Id.
178
Id. [33] (emphasis added).
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any alleged torts occurred there, not in the United Kingdom.179 This motion
echoes the concern that ATS claims would “improperly interfere[] with
[countries’] rights to regulate their citizens and conduct in their own territory”
by claiming that the United Kingdom is taking over the authority properly vested
in the Zambia.180 While a parent company’s duty of care for its subsidiary’s
actions abroad has not been explicitly decided, it has been suggested that this
case “has made it clear that U.K.-based parent companies may be found liable
for human rights violations committed by their foreign subsidiaries.”181
In Canada, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice allowed a claim for human
rights abuses committed abroad to proceed based on a “novel duty of care.”182
In Choc v. Hudbay, Guatemalan plaintiffs brought a suit against Hudbay
Minerals Inc. and its wholly-owned Guatemalan subsidiary, CGN.183 Claimants
pled two theories: direct liability for a parent corporation “in negligence for its
own actions and omissions in another country” and liability for a foreign
subsidiary’s actions under an agency theory, based on piercing the corporate
veil.184 While this case has not yet been decided on the merits, the court has
allowed the claim based on piercing the corporate veil to proceed to trial.185
In the Netherlands, the Hague Court of Appeal found jurisdiction over Dutch
corporation Royal Dutch Shell’s (RDS) wholly-owned foreign subsidiary,
SPDC, in a suit for liability for oil pollution in the Niger Delta.186 In Akpan v.
Royal Dutch Shell PLC, the plaintiffs alleged that SPDC negligently caused or
failed to prevent a number of oil spills in 2005 and 2006 and that RDS acted
negligently by not preventing its subsidiary’s negligence.187 The District Court
of the Hague found RDS liable for not taking measures to prevent sabotage and

179

Id. [40] (citing Lungowe [2016] EWHC (TCC) 975 [93]).
Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 78 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting in part);
see also Lungowe [2017] EWCA (Civ) 1528 [40] (citing Lungowe [2016] EWHC (TCC) 975 [93]).
181
Viren Mascarenhas & Kayla Winarsky Green, Landmark UK Case Takes a Stand: Parent Companies
May Be Liable for Their Subsidiaries’ Alleged Human Rights Abuses, KING & SPALDING: ENERGY NEWSL.
(Feb. 7, 2018), https://www.kslaw.com/blog-posts/landmark-uk-case-takes-a-stand-parent-companies-may-beliable-for-their-subsidiaries-alleged-human-rights-abuses.
182
Choc v. Hudbay Minerals Inc. (2013), 116 O.R. 3d 674, para. 75 (Can. Ont. Super. Ct. J.).
183
Id. para. 4.
184
Id. para. 50.
185
Id. para 49.
186
Cees van Dam, Preliminary Judgments Dutch Court of Appeal in the Shell Nigeria Case, ROTTERDAM
SCH. MGMT. (Jan. 14, 2016), https://www.rsm.nl/fileadmin/Images_NEW/Sites/Chair_IBHR/Publications/
Van_Dam_-_Preliminary_judgments_Dutch_Shell_case.pdf (citing Hof Den Haag 18 december 2015,
ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2015:3587 m.nt. (Shell Petrol. Dev. Co. of Nigeria/Akpan) (Neth.)).
187
Id.
180
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ordered the subsidiary SPDC to pay damages to a Nigerian farmer whose land
and water were damaged by the oil spills.188
RDS and SPDC appealed the district court’s judgment.189 One question on
appeal was the district court’s finding of jurisdiction over both RDS and
SPDC.190 The court upheld the ruling that jurisdiction had been proper.191 The
appellate court found that it was undisputed that there is jurisdiction over RDS
“on the basis of the Brussels I Regulation. Article 2 . . . that persons domiciled
in a Member State shall be sued in the court of that Member State[,] and
[A]rticle 60 holds that a company is domiciled at the place where it has its
statutory seat.”192 The court found jurisdiction over SPDC based on the plurality
of defendants doctrine.193 This doctrine, found in Article 7(1) of the Dutch Code
of Civil Procedure, allows a court to “hear a case against a defendant that is not
within its jurisdiction provided the claim is in such a way related to the claim of
[a] defendant over which the court does have jurisdiction [and] that reasons of
efficiency justify a joint hearing.”194 The appellate court found it important that
the defendants were part of the same business group.195 Additionally, the court
was receptive, although cautious, to the possibility that a parent may be liable
for the torts of its subsidiaries.196 This aligns with the district court’s recognition
of the “international trend to hold parent companies of multinationals liable in
their own countries for the harmful practices of their foreign []subsidiaries.”197
Although it was important that the parent and subsidiary were sued together, the
district court found that even if the claims against RDS were dismissed, it would
retain jurisdiction over SPDC.198
These three cases, along with the French Law 2017-399, demonstrate that
other countries are not universally opposed to holding foreign subsidiaries of

188
Id.; Donald Robertson et al., Emerging Trend: Multinationals Being Sued in Their Home Countries for
Harmful Practices of Their Foreign Operations, LEXOLOGY (Mar. 21, 2013), https://www.lexology.com/library/
detail.aspx?g=4dd2c1fb-ad2d-417d-aafd-05296931a858 (originally published on the law firm Herbert Smith
Freehills’s website).
189
van Dam, supra note 186, ¶ 07.
190
Id.
191
Id. ¶¶ 10–11.
192
Id. ¶ 10. The Brussels I Regulation is an EU law regulating the jurisdiction of courts of member
countries. Parliament and Council Regulation 1215/2012, 2012 O.J. (L 351/1).
193
Robertson et al., supra note 188 (citing Rb. Den Haag 30 januari 2013, NJF 2013,
ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2013:BY9854 m.nt. (Akpan/Royal Dutch Shell PLC) (Neth.)).
194
van Dam, supra note 186, ¶ 11.
195
Id. ¶ 12.
196
Id. ¶¶ 14–17.
197
Robertson et al., supra note 188.
198
Id. (citing Rb. Den Haag ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2013:BY9854 (Akpan)).
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domestic corporations liable for their wrongdoing. Most ATS concerns in this
arena are related to exhaustion of foreign remedies, potential interference with
internal judicial processes, and a flood of suits by foreign plaintiffs against
foreign defendants for conduct taking place entirely on foreign soil.199 By
limiting the exception to Jesner and Kiobel to actions taken by subsidiaries of
American corporations, instead of entirely foreign corporations, many of these
concerns can be alleviated.
2. Responsibility to Hold Human Rights Violators Responsible
Providing a forum to hold U.S. corporations or their wholly-owned
subsidiaries liable for their violations of international law abroad can be a benefit
to U.S. foreign policy. Despite the Supreme Court’s focus on foreign protests,
foreign governments have rarely opposed ATS litigation, suggesting that the
benefits of ATS suits outweigh their costs.200 Following cases in England,
Canada, and the Netherlands, it appears that foreign courts are beginning to
follow the “international trend to hold parent companies of multinationals liable
in their own country for the harmful practices of foreign subsidiaries.”201 ATS
litigation benefits both the United States’ and other nations’ soft power because
it signals compliance with human rights law and international law.202 Signaling
compliance with the law “is generally in a state’s interest . . . because it signals
[the state] has characteristics that make it an appealing[,] cooperative partner.”203
Additionally, because ATS litigation places much of the cost of lengthy
international law cases on U.S. courts, it benefits other states and provides them
a cheap way to signal compliance.204

199

Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1430 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Knowles, supra note 155, at 1170.
201
Robertson et al., supra note 188; see also Loi 2017-399 du 27 mars 2017 relative au devoir de vigilance
des sociétés mères et des entreprises donneuses d’ordre [Law 2017-339 of March 27, 2017 Relating to the Duty
of Care of Parent Companies and Instructing Companies], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE
[J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Mar. 28, 2017; Choc v. Hudbay Minerals Inc. (2013), 116 O.R. 3d 674
(Can. Ont. Super. Ct. J.); Rb. Den Haag ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2013:BY9854 (Akpan); Lungowe v. Vedanta Res.
PLC [2017] EWCA (Civ) 1528 (Eng.).
202
Knowles, supra note 155, at 1170–75; see generally JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO
SUCCESS IN WORLD POLITICS (Public Affairs 2009). “Soft power” is power that a country can use to obtain its
desired outcomes without threat. Id. at 5. Countries may follow another’s lead for reasons such as “admir[ation
for] its values, [a desire to] emulat[e] its example, [or] aspir[ations] to its level of prosperity and openness.” Id.
Soft power is derived from cooperation instead of coercion; it lies in “the ability to shape the preferences of
others.” Id. This can help to shape the long-term course of society and politics in a subtler way than “hard power”
(the use of force), and perhaps with more sticking power as it relies on the changing of opinion and attitudes. Id.
203
Knowles, supra note 155, at 1169.
204
Id. at 1175 (“ATS litigation actually enables cheaper signaling for them as well because the target
nations do not have to pay the often high costs of bringing human rights violators to justice.”).
200
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Importantly, permitting ATS litigation against human rights violators helps
the United States shape international human rights common law.205 Many human
rights issues are litigated for the first time through the ATS, giving the United
States a chance to act as a “norm definer” in international law.206 This role as
“norm definer” would be lost without the ATS, decreasing American influence
internationally.207 For example, the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia (ICTY) cited an ATS case when recognizing the “universal
revulsion against torture.”208 When the Second Circuit decided in Kadić v.
Karadžić that genocide and war crimes do not require state action, its reasoning
was relied upon by the ICTY to impose liability for crimes against humanity.209
ATS litigation has been relied upon in cases in the United Kingdom (including
important cases such as the infamous Pinochet litigation of the former Chilean
dictator), France, and Switzerland.210 The National Commission on Human
Rights in India has relied upon the ATS as an “example for the development of
domestic legal remedies for human rights violations,” and U.N. special
rapporteurs have recognized the ATS “as a model for establishing national
remedies for human rights abuses.”211 Even if the United States loses its status
as the leading superpower and American influence declines, American norms
and values will still be protected because the United States will continue to
influence customary international law on human rights abuses though ATS
litigation.212
205

Id. at 1124.
Id. at 1171 (citing David H. Moore, A Signaling Theory of Human Rights Compliance, 97 NW. U. L.
REV. 879, 889–90 (2003)).
207
Id.
208
Prosecutor v. Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment of the Trial Chamber, ¶ 147 (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998) (citing Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980)).
209
Kadić v. Karadžić, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995); Sarah H. Cleveland, The Alien Tort Statute, Civil
Society, and Corporate Responsibility, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 971, 976 (2004) (citing Kadić, 70 F.3d 232;
Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment of the Trial Chamber, ¶ 655 (Int’l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997)).
210
Cleveland, supra note 209, at 977–78 (citing R v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate (Ex parte
Pinochet Ugarte) (Pinochet III) [1999] UKHL 1, [2000] 1 AC 147 (HL) 198 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson; Lord
Hope of Craighead) (prosecuting the former Chilean dictator, Augusto Pinochet); Swiss Court Allows Gypsies
to Sue IBM over Alleged Holocaust Link, TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT (June 22, 2004) (URL link is defunct)).
211
Cleveland, supra note 209, at 978 (citing Sadar Patel Bhawan, Case No. 1/97/NHRC ¶ 23 (Nat’l Human
Rights Comm’n Aug. 4, 1997) (India)); The Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Violations of
International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law: Note by the High Commissioner for Human Rights, U.N.
ESCOR, Human Rights Comm’n, 59th Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 11, ¶ 114, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2003/63
(Dec. 27, 2002) (offering the ATS as an example for states to “provide remedies for violations occurring outside
their territory”); Contemporary Forms of Slavery: Systematic Rape, Sexual Slavery, and Slavery-Like Practices
During Armed Conflict: Final Report Submitted by Ms. Gay J. McDougall, Special Rapporteur, U.N. ESCOR,
Human Rights Comm’n, 50th Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 6, at app., ¶ 52, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1998/13
(June 22, 1998) (applauding the ATS for providing a forum for redress when foreign fora are inadequate)).
212
Knowles, supra note 155, at 1173.
206
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ATS litigation for human rights violators can improve the reputation of the
United States abroad.213 There is evidence that these suits improve the United
States’ reputation in regions like Africa and Latin America.214 For example, a
study in Africa concluded that “‘the ATS has enhanced the image of the United
States as a purveyor of human rights’” and “many Africans ‘have a sincere
appreciation for the United States as a place where they can seek justice against
those who would otherwise never be challenged in their own countries.’”215
Furthermore, litigation against corporate defendants for acts committed abroad,
especially when the corporation or corporate parent is American, might be seen
as a response or limit on neocolonialism.216 Improving the reputation of the
United States abroad can also have national security benefits. For example, by
improving its reputation abroad and lowering anti-American sentiment, it can be
easier for the United States to open or operate overseas military bases.217
Other states have considered their responsibility to hold human rights
violators liable for their actions when deciding whether to hold domestic or
foreign corporations liable for actions taken abroad. In the Lungowe case in
England, claimants argued that the parent company, Vedanta, failed to meet its
duty of care over its subsidiary, KCM, leading to human rights violations.218
In determining whether a duty of care existed, the English courts sought to
assign liability to those responsible for the harms.219 The trial court in Lungowe
specifically considered the ability to hold the actual perpetrators of harms liable
when upholding jurisdiction.220 The judge acknowledged that claimants may be
suing the parent solely to find jurisdiction over the subsidiary.221 However,
evidence that Vedanta was seen as “the real architect” of the harm was
persuasive when finding jurisdiction.222 Additionally, the court recognized that

213

Id. at 1161.
Id.
215
Id. (quoting HARRY AKOH, HOW A COUNTRY TREATS ITS CITIZENS NO LONGER EXCLUSIVE DOMESTIC
CONCERN: A HISTORY OF THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE LITIGATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
VIOLATIONS COMMITTED IN AFRICA 1980–2008, at 248 (2009)).
216
Knowles, supra note 155, at 1161 (“Lawsuits against MNCs are unlikely to provoke resentment or
allegations of neocolonialism in such contexts because MNCs are themselves viewed by much of the population
as foreign, and sometimes even hostile, elements, particularly if they aid and abet human rights abuses.”).
217
Id. at 1170 (citing Ryan M. Scoville, A Sociological Approach to the Negotiation of Military Base
Agreements, 14 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2006)).
218
Lungowe v. Vedanta Res. PLC [2016] EWHC (TCC) 975 [1].
219
See Lungowe v. Vedanta Res. PLC [2017] EWCA (Civ) 1528; Lungowe [2016] EWHC (TCC) 975.
220
Lungowe [2016] EWHC (TCC) 975 [75]–[82].
221
Id. [75].
222
Id. [78].
214
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Vedanta could liquidate its subsidiary if it lost in court abroad, whereas a direct
suit in England removed this risk.223
Courts also consider access to justice issues, and are more likely to hear a
case when claimants can establish “a real risk that they would not obtain
substantial justice” in the nation where the tort occurred.224 The most recent
Lungowe appeal, decided in claimants’ favor, turned on this issue.225 The
difficulty in finding justice in the nation where the tort occurred may be due to
poverty, structural deficiencies, and the ability of the subsidiary to manipulate
the system to delay proceedings and make them too costly.226 These risks are
especially prevalent in cases in which the tort occurred in a country with minimal
access to justice.227 When considering the responsibility to hold human rights
violators liable, the potential difficulty in finding justice abroad was a significant
factor for the English judges.228
In a duty of care analysis, the Canadian court in Choc v. Hudbay considered
both the proportion of responsibility among the defendant parent and
subsidiaries and its responsibility to find wrongdoers liable.229 In Hudbay, the
plaintiffs claim that Hudbay was negligent in failing to prevent harms committed
by security personnel it hired.230 The plaintiffs claimed that “security personnel
working for Hudbay’s subsidiaries, who were allegedly under the control and
supervision of Hudbay, the parent company, committed human rights abuses . . .
. [including] a shooting, a killing[,] and gang-rapes.”231 To be found negligent,
plaintiffs must prove that Hudbay owed them a duty of care.232 As there is not
yet an established duty of care that applies to this situation, the court must find
a novel duty of care, applying the Anns Test.233 The Anns Test requires:
(1) that the harm complained of is a reasonably foreseeable
consequence of the alleged breach; (2) that there is sufficient
proximity between the parties that it would not be unjust or unfair to

223

Id. [79].
Lungowe v. Vedanta Res. PLC [2017] EWCA (Civ) 1528 [131].
225
Vedanta Res. PLC v. Lungowe [2019] UKSC 20 [88]–[102].
226
Lungowe v. Vedanta Res. PLC [2017] EWCA (Civ) 1528 [118]–[135]; see Lubbe v. Cape PLC [2000]
UKHL 41 (appeal taken from Eng.) (UK).
227
Lungowe v. Vedanta Res. PLC [2017] EWCA (Civ) 1528 [118]–[135]; see Lubbe v. Cape PLC [2000]
UKHL 41 (appeal taken from Eng.) (UK).
228
Lungowe [2017] EWCA (Civ) 1528 [118]–[135]; see Lubbe [2000] UKHL 41.
229
Choc v. Hudbay Minerals Inc. (2013), 116 O.R. 3d 674 (Can. Ont. Super. Ct. J.).
230
Id. para. 52.
231
Id. para. 4.
232
Id. para. 55.
233
Id. paras. 54–56.
224
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impose a duty of care on the defendants; and, (3) that there exist no
policy reasons to [negate] or otherwise restrict that duty.234

Taking the facts pled as true, the court found a prima facie duty of care.235 First,
factors such as Hudbay’s knowledge that “violence was frequently used by
security personnel” and had been previously used in evictions requested by
Hudbay, as well as that security personnel were “unlicensed, inadequately
trained[,] and in possession of unlicensed and illegal firearms” were sufficient
to establish foreseeability, if proven at trial.236 Second, proximity requires that
the plaintiff and defendant have a relationship such that the defendant “may be
said to be under an obligation to be mindful of the plaintiff’s legitimate interests
in conducting his or her affairs.”237 Third, the test involves examining factors
such as “expectations, representations, reliance, and the property or other
interests involved.”238
Statements from Hudbay committing to respect human rights in the
communities and the establishment of a mining project causing the forced
evictions of plaintiffs were sufficient to establish proximity, if proven at trial.239
The fact that there were competing public policy interests was insufficient to
prevent a prima facie finding of a duty of care.240 Importantly, some of these
interests mirror certain arguments for and against ATS liability.241 While one
concern was about exposing domestic corporations with foreign subsidiaries to
expanded liability, the other was the responsibility of courts to provide redress
for communities affected by a corporation’s actions when torts occur away from
the corporation’s home.242
Because Hudbay has not yet been decided on the merits, it is unknown if
such a duty will be established.243 If established, however, the implications may
be significant. Such a duty could broaden exposure to liability for “Canadian
corporations doing business abroad, not only in the natural resources sector[,]
but also in various other sectors, including banking, manufacturing, retailing[,]
234

Id. para. 57 (citing Odhavji Estate v. Woodhouse, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 263 (Can.)).
Id. paras. 58–70.
236
Id. paras. 63–65.
237
Id. para. 66 (quoting Cooper v. Hobart, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 537 (Can.)).
238
Id. (quoting Cooper, 3 S.C.R. 537).
239
Id. paras. 69–70.
240
Id. para. 74.
241
See id. paras. 72–73; infra Part IV.
242
Id. paras. 72–73.
243
Grahame Russell, This Is How Hard It Is, 8 Years into the Hudbay Minerals/CGN Lawsuits Seeking
Justice for Rape, Murder, & Repression in Guatemala, RTS. ACTION (July 14, 2018), https://mailchi.mp/
rightsaction/this-is-how-hard-it-is-8-years-into-the-hudbay-mineralscgn-lawsuits.
235
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and telecommunications.”244 The “practical implication[] of [allowing the
lawsuit to continue] . . . is that the defendants must now proceed with complex
and costly litigation.”245 Since the court’s ruling in 2013, discovery has
continued into 2018.246
French law also supports the goal of holding perpetrators of wrongs liable
for their actions.247 In establishing a due diligence requirement for parent
companies, Law 2017-399 would find parent companies liable for their
subsidiaries’ actions when they do not meet the requirements set forth in the
statute, including monitoring of subsidiaries and taking action to mitigate risk.248
When a parent company has not taken these steps, the parent company may be
statutorily liable.249 However, when these steps are taken but harm still occurs,
the presumption of liability shifts to the subsidiary that caused the harm in
question.250 Law 2017-399 seeks to promote actions by parent companies to
prevent harm and find liable those who do not.251
B. Impacts on Foreign Investment and Corporate Limited Liability
The plurality in Jesner expressed concern that if the United States subjects
foreign corporations to liability, other nations will be more likely to find liability
for American corporations abroad.252 The Supreme Court suggests this will
cause a massive liability risk to American corporations for their employees’ and
subsidiaries’ conduct around the world.253 Such a liability risk could “hinder
global investment in developing economies, where it is most needed.”254
244
Jeremy Fraiberg et al., Ontario Court Gives Green Light to International Human Rights Tort Claims
in Choc v. Hudbay Minerals Inc., OSLER: RES.: CROSS-BORDER MKTS. (July 26, 2013), https://www.osler.com/
en/resources/cross-border/2013/ontario-court-gives-green-light-to-international-h.
245
Sean E.D. Fairhurst & Zoe Thoms, Post-Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.: Is Canada Poised to
Become an Alternative Jurisdiction for Extraterritorial Human Rights Litigation?, 52 ALTA. L. REV. 389, 404
(2014).
246
Russell, supra note 243. In January 2020, the Superior Court of Justice allowed plaintiffs in a related
case to amend their lawsuit and add new claims. CHOC V. HUDBAY MINERALS INC. & CAAL V. HUDBAY
MINERALS INC. (Jan. 2020), http://www.chocversushudbay.com/. As of January 2020, each of the three

related cases are proceeding. Id.
247
Loi 2017-399 du 27 mars 2017 relative au devoir de vigilance des sociétés mères et des entreprises
donneuses d’ordre [Law 2017-339 of March 27, 2017 Relating to the Duty of Care of Parent Companies and
Instructing Companies], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF
FRANCE], Mar. 28, 2017.
248
Id.
249
Id.
250
Id.
251
Id.
252
Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1405 (2018) (plurality opinion).
253
Id.
254
Id. (quoting Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 20, Am. Isuzu Motors, Inc. v. Ntsebeza, 553
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Business owners (including corporate owners of subsidiaries) generally enjoy
limited liability in relation to their companies’ contracts, torts, and other
liabilities.255 “Allowing individuals to seek remedy from parent[] corporations
for minor harms might be so onerous for corporations that it deters them from
creating or investing in subsidiaries in host countries that could benefit from the
enterprise’s presence[,]” and these suits may limit “the free flow of trade and
investment.”256
When seeking to bring suits against a parent for the torts of its subsidiary,
foreign courts have considered the limited liability provided by the corporate
structure.257 For example, in Lungowe, the parent argued that the real claim was
against its subsidiary and that Vedanta was included simply to find jurisdiction
over the subsidiary.258 Discussing a parent company’s possible duty of care for
the torts of its subsidiaries, the English court noted that, although there have
been no reported cases in which a parent company was held to owe a duty of
care to a person affected by the action of a subsidiary, “[that] does not render
such a claim unarguable.”259
Contrary to the statements of the court in Lungowe, there have been cases in
which claims by employees of a subsidiary have succeeded against the parent
company.260 Following rulings in three prior cases, the Lungowe court found that
there are situations in which a corporation could be liable for torts committed by
its subsidiaries abroad.261 When considering whether the parent has assumed a
duty of care to those directly affected by operations of the subsidiary, the English
courts consider factors similar to veil-piercing:
(1) The starting point is the three-part test of foreseeability,
proximity[,] and reasonableness. (2) A duty may be owed by a parent
company to the employee of a subsidiary, or a party directly affected
by the operations of that subsidiary, in certain circumstances.
(3) Those circumstances may arise where the parent company (a) has
taken direct responsibility for devising a material health and safety
U.S. 1028 (2008) (No. 07-919)).
255
Matheson, supra note 47, at 3.
256
Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1436 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae
at 12–16, 20, Am. Isuzu Motors, Inc. v. Ntsebeza, 553 U.S. 1028 (2008) (No. 07-919)); Gwynne Skinner, supra
note 131, at 1811.
257
See e.g., Choc v. Hudbay Minerals Inc. (2013), 116 O.R. 3d 674 (Can. Ont. Super. Ct. J.).
258
Lungowe v. Vedanta Res. PLC [2016] EWHC (TCC) 975 [51]–[52] (Eng.).
259
Lungowe v. Vedanta Res. PLC [2017] EWCA (Civ) 1528 [88] (Eng.).
260
See e.g., Chandler v. Cape PLC [2012] EWCA (Civ) 525 (Eng.) (holding that the parent company
assumed a duty of care to ensure the health and safety of the subsidiary’s employees).
261
Lungowe [2016] EWHC (TCC) 975 [44] (citing Andrew Sanger, Crossing the Corporate Veil,
71 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 478 (2012)).
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policy the adequacy of which is the subject of the claim, or (b) controls
the operations which give rise to the claim.262

These factors do not require that the parent has absolute control over the
operations of the subsidiary.263 Instead, the courts should consider “what part
the defendant played in controlling the operations of the group, what its directors
and employees knew or ought to have known, [and] what action was taken and
not taken.”264
The French law has created a specific exception to corporate limited liability
in regard to subsidiaries’ actions abroad.265 By creating a statutory duty, French
companies must ensure their subsidiaries do not violate human rights norms.266
While this exception goes beyond the one proposed in this Comment because it
establishes liability for the corporate parent, it demonstrates that exceptions to
corporate limited liability should exist when necessary to prevent human rights
violations.
The proposal put forth in this Comment differs in that it does not ask the
United States to allow jurisdiction over corporate parents directly, or over all
foreign corporations, but only those owned by American companies. The United
States should not protect its corporations and grant them immunity when their
subsidiaries engage in egregious human rights violations. The protections in
Sosa also limit the impact of these litigations.267 It is unlikely that any claims
under the ATS would be considered “minor,” as norms of international law
meeting the Sosa criteria must be “specific, universal, and obligatory.”268
Additionally, any violations of these obligatory international law norms are
likely to cause harm outweighing any economic benefit to the local
communities.269

262

Lungowe [2017] EWCA (Civ) 1528 [83].
Id. [77] (citing Chandler [2012] EWCA (Civ) 525).
264
Id. [76] (quoting Lubbe [2000] UKHL 41 [20]).
265
Loi 2017-399 du 27 mars 2017 relative au devoir de vigilance des sociétés mères et des entreprises
donneuses d’ordre [Law 2017-339 of March 27, 2017 Relating to the Duty of Care of Parent Companies and
Instructing Companies], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF
FRANCE], Mar. 28, 2017.
266
Id.
267
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004).
268
Id.
269
Skinner, supra note 131, at 1811.
263
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C. Political Question
The plurality in Jesner argued that the question of corporate liability is a
political one and therefore should be left to the political branches.270 Taking
separation-of-powers principles into account, the Court stated that “[t]he
political branches, not the Judiciary, have the responsibility and institutional
capacity to weigh foreign-policy concerns.”271 It may be the case that Congress
is best placed to enact an exception which allows for suits against foreign
subsidiaries of domestic parents.
However, proponents of ATS litigation have provided strong reasons for
why the Court has power to create an exception. As highlighted by Justice
Sotomayor in her dissent, the political branches in the past have urged the courts
to reach “exactly the opposite conclusion of the one embraced by the
majority.”272 For example, in Kiobel, the executive department specifically
stated that “[c]ourts may recognize corporate liability in actions under the ATS
as a matter of federal common law.”273 During oral arguments for Jesner, the
United States suggested that “foreclosing the ability to recover from a
corporation actually would raise ‘the possibility of friction.’”274 Members of
Congress have also advised the Court specifically against the holdings in Jesner
and Kiobel.275 Furthermore, Justice Sotomayor notes that Congress has
consistently failed to immunize corporations from ATS liability, despite
numerous suits brought against corporations over the years.276 The Court, in the
past, used this rationale to suggest that, in failing “to disturb a consistent judicial
interpretation of a statute,” Congress “at least acquiesces in, and apparently
affirms,” that interpretation.277
When established, it was undisputed that the ATS applied to both natural
and legal persons.278 The ATS undisputedly establishes jurisdiction over ships
for piracy, which are not natural persons.279 When the ATS was enacted, ships,
270

Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1408 (2018) (plurality opinion).
Id. at 1403 (citing Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 569 U.S. 108, 116–17 (2013)).
272
Id. at 1431 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
273
Id. (quoting Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 7, Kiobel v. Royal
Dutch Petrol. Co., 569 U.S. 108 (2013) (No. 10-1491)).
274
Id.
275
Id. at 1431–32 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing Brief of U.S. Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse et al. as Amici
Curiae at 7–11; then citing Brief of Former U.S. Sen. Arlen Specter et al. as Amici Curiae at 17–18, Kiobel v.
Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 569 U.S. 108 (2013) (No. 10-1491)).
276
Id. at 1432.
277
Id. at 1432 (citing Monessen Sw. Ry. v. Morgan, 486 U.S. 330, 338 (1998)).
278
Id. at 1426.
279
Id.
271
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which are juridical entities, were commonly held to be liable for piracy.280 In
other parts of the Act that became the ATS, Congress specifically limited
permitted classes of defendants, something it did not do when drafting the
ATS.281 This suggests that Congress acted purposefully when not limiting the
range of defendants in the ATS.282
Justice Sotomayor also rejects the idea that because the Torture Victim
Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA) is limited to individual defendants, the Court
should extrapolate this limitation to the ATS.283 The TVPA was designed to
expand the ATS, not limit it.284 The congressional record shows that both the
House and Senate viewed the TVPA as a supplement, to allow both aliens and
Americans a “clear and specific remedy . . . for torture and extrajudicial
killing[,]” but the ATS “has other important uses and should not be replaced.”285
In other statutes, such as the Antiterrorism Act of 1990, Congress specifically
provided for corporate liability (for foreign and domestic corporations).286
Taken together, these statutes suggest that Congress finds that corporate liability
is a question that should be determined norm-by-norm, not with broad strokes.287
IV. PROPOSAL
This Comment proposes an exception to the limitations on the ATS imposed
by the Supreme Court in Kiobel and Jesner. Combined, these limitations mean
that almost no harms to aliens caused by corporations will be judiciable in U.S.
courts.288 Actions taken by U.S. corporations overseas are unlikely to overcome
Kiobel’s presumption against extraterritoriality.289 Jesner establishes a
wholesale bar on any suits against foreign corporations, even if those
corporations are wholly owned by and run by a U.S. company.290 If a foreign
corporation violates an alien’s human rights in the United States, the ATS
provides no remedy against the corporation. The only remedy is against
280

Id. (citing The Marianna Flora, 24 U.S. 1 (1826); then citing Harmony v. United States, 43 U.S. 210

(1844)).
281

Id.
Id. (quoting Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (“Where Congress includes particular
language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that
Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.”)).
283
Id. at 1432–33 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
284
Id. at 1432.
285
Id. at 1432–33 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 102-367, pt. 1, p. 3 (1991)).
286
Id. at 1433.
287
Id.
288
See supra Section III.C.
289
See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 569 U.S. 108, 125 (2013).
290
Jesner, 138 S. Ct. 1386.
282
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individuals who are “less likely to be able to fully compensate successful ATS
plaintiffs.”291 Without corporate accountability, “institution-wide disregard for
human rights . . . . will persist unremedied.”292
For that reason, the ATS should include an exception for foreign subsidiaries
of domestic corporations. Accounting standards are instructive when
determining the ownership level necessary for this exception to apply.293
Requiring a subsidiary be wholly owned would allow corporations to split off a
small percentage of ownership to avoid liability. Instead the exception should be
based on control, using the definition of a majority-owned subsidiary set forth
in SEC regulations.294 Under these regulations, a majority-owned subsidiary is
one in which the parent (or the parent’s other majority-owned subsidiaries)
controls more than 50% of outstanding voting shares.295
This exception addresses the foreign policy concerns of bringing a purely
foreign corporation into U.S. courts for violations that have occurred purely
overseas, causing harm to only foreign victims. The ATS was originally enacted,
in part, to find Americans liable for acts committed abroad in violation of the
law of nations.296 The fact that a subsidiary is owned by an American corporation
291
292

Id. at 1435 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Id. Justice Sotomayor gives the example of a foreign corporation:
posing as a job-placement agency that actually traffics in persons, forcibly transporting foreign
nationals to the United States for exploitation and profiting from their abuse. Not only are the
individual employees for the business less likely to be able to fully compensate successful ATS
plaintiffs, but holding only individual employees liable does not impose accountability for the
institution-wide disregard for human rights. Absent a corporate sanction, that harm will persist
unremedied.

Id.
293
See WILLIAM J. CARNEY, CORPORATE FINANCE 8 (Univ. Casebook Series, 3d ed. 2015). “Where a
corporation owns 50% or more of the voting power of another corporation, it is deemed to have the power to
control its affairs.” Id.
294
17 C.F.R. § 210.1-02(n) (2018).
295
Id.
296
Skinner, supra note 17, at 189–90 (“Many events leading up to the enactment of the ATS involved
U.S. citizens violating aliens’ rights . . . . There is also an opinion by the first Attorney General concerning an
American who led a French fleet in attacking and plundering a British slave colony in Sierra Leone. Attorney
General William Bradford’s 1795 opinion clarified that although the United States did not have criminal
jurisdiction over the matter, which he acknowledged was a violation of the law of nations, the ATS provided
federal jurisdiction for a civil remedy against Americans who had taken part in the attack. Moreover, one of the
primary drafters of the First Judiciary Act, William Paterson, opined that the law of nations provided the
substantive law for domestic remedies of international law violations, using the example of a U.S. citizen
enlisting in the British Army to fight the French in violation of the United States’ position of neutrality . . . .
These latter two examples also demonstrate that the founders were not only concerned with remedying violations
that occurred within the United States, but also with any violation perpetrated against an alien by a U.S. citizen,
even if occurring abroad.”).

ANDERSON_5.26.20

2020]

5/26/2020 2:56 PM

AN EXCEPTION TO JESNER

1029

should be enough evidence under Kiobel’s “touch and concern” requirement.297
This finding can be made without disturbing the political question doctrine—at
least to allow a suit to proceed to discovery. However, there is an argument that
creating such liability (at least for the purposes of jurisdiction) automatically
creates a new cause of action that is beyond the capacity of the courts, and thus
would require a statute.298
In many cases, foreign subsidiaries share the name of the domestic
corporation, share members of their boards, and function as local bases for
management and logistics, while remaining integrated with the global supply
chain and marketplace.299 Regardless of these shared characteristics, plaintiffs
in suits against these corporations will rarely succeed in meeting the stringent
requirements to pierce the corporate veil. Even if the requirements are met, much
of the information needed to do so will only be available during discovery, and
not before.300 In federal courts, it seems that veil piercing cannot be maintained
as an independent cause of action, but instead is a “means of imposing liability
on an underlying cause of action.”301 This is why an exception allowing suits to
proceed to discovery is necessary.
Allowing an exception for suit directly against foreign subsidiaries helps
limit liability for major American corporations. The proposed exception does
not allow suits against parents in the first instance for the acts of their
subsidiaries. Instead of imposing liability against the parent for acts of their
subsidiaries, liability will be imposed against the subsidiary only. This will
incentivize parent corporations to ensure that their subsidiaries respect human
rights while protecting themselves and their other subsidiaries unrelated to the
suit from potentially multibillion-dollar lawsuits.
This will, in effect, create a “due diligence” requirement similar to the
French statute.302 Parent corporations will be incentivized to take measures to
protect against human rights violations by their subsidiaries, including
297

Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 569 U.S. 108, 124–25 (2013).
See Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1413–14 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
299
See e.g., Doe v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 937 (9th Cir. 2002).
300
Elizabeth S. Fenton, Trends in Piercing the Corporate Veil, A.B.A. (July 31, 2013), http://apps.
americanbar.org/litigation/committees/businesstorts/articles/summer2013-0713-trends-in-jurisprudencepiercing-the-corporate-veil.html.
301
See e.g., Peacock v. Thomas, 516 U.S. 349, 354 (1996) (quoting 1 C. KEATING & G. O’GRADNEY,
FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 41 (perm. ed. 1990)).
302
Loi 2017-399 du 27 mars 2017 relative au devoir de vigilance des sociétés mères et des entreprises
donneuses d’ordre [Law 2017-339 of March 27, 2017 Relating to the Duty of Care of Parent Companies and
Instructing Companies], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF
FRANCE], Mar. 28, 2017.
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monitoring and evaluation. However, unlike the French statute, liability will not
be automatic.303 This proposal also differs from the Dutch approach, in which
jurisdiction is based on the nationality of the parent through a group liability
approach that almost disregards the corporate form entirely (viewing the
corporation and its subsidiary as a single group).304 The exception will also have
an effect similar to the duty of care theory suggested by the English and
Canadian courts.305 However, an exception of this kind will help protect the
parent company while still allowing judgments against the subsidiary.
The proposed exception does require a rule to ensure that the parent does not
decapitalize the subsidiary to avoid payment following a judgement, a concern
of the English court in Lungowe.306 Although such a rule must be limited in
scope to avoid interfering with legitimate interests, veil-piercing may provide an
example. The rule could be based on the traditional veil-piercing analysis
because undercapitalization is a factor in veil-piercing. Alternatively, or
additionally, there could be a provision allowing a plaintiff to sue the parent to
enforce the judgment against its subsidiary. However, this requirement should
be narrow to ensure that liability is not, in effect, transferred to the parent.
Judgments should be reasonable based on the subsidiary’s size, not the size of
the corporate parent.
For example, consider Parent Company A, worth $50 billion, that owns and
operates a mine through wholly-owned Subsidiary B. Subsidiary B, including
the mine it owns, is worth $500 million. If Subsidiary B is engaging in human
rights abuses at the mine, such as the use of slave labor, a remedy should not
exceed $500 million, even though Parent Company A is worth $50 billion. This
constraint will help limit the risks of a parent corporation operating a subsidiary
in other states while still protecting the limited liability of corporate structure.
This proposal differs from others proposed in response to the Kiobel limitations
in that it suggests that the subsidiary be the target of the suit, not the parent.307
A hurdle to this proposal is the limit to personal jurisdiction set out in
Goodyear Dunlop Tire Operations v. Brown and Daimler AG v. Bauman.308
303

Id.
Robertson et al., supra note 188 (citing Rb. Den Haag 30 januari 2013, NJF 2013,
ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2013:BY9854 m.nt. (Akpan/Royal Dutch Shell PLC) (Neth.)).
305
See Lungowe v. Vedanta Res. PLC [2017] EWCA (Civ) 1528 (Eng.); Choc v. Hudbay Minerals Inc.
(2013), 116 O.R. 3d 674 (Can. Ont. Super. Ct. J.).
306
Lungowe v. Vedanta Res. PLC [2016] EWHC (TCC) 975 [79] (Eng.).
307
See e.g., Law 2017-339 of March 27, 2017 (Fr.); Skinner, supra note 17, at 258–61.
308
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown,
564 U.S. 915 (2011).
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Suits against a foreign subsidiary for actions abroad will not satisfy a specific
jurisdictional test unless there is evidence that the acts were specifically directed
or otherwise connected to the jurisdiction of suit.309 A suit under the exception
proposed would be somewhat opposite to the suit in Daimler, in which the
jurisdictional hook was much more tenuous.310 In Daimler, the claims were
brought against a foreign parent based on the actions of a foreign subsidiary; the
only connection to the United States was another domestic subsidiary.311 Instead
of suing the foreign parent based on the connections of the U.S. subsidiary, under
the proposed exception the foreign subsidiary would be sued based on the
connections of the U.S. parent. A limited exception to Daimler can, and should,
be found by implementing this proposal. The corporate parent derives significant
benefit from the corporate structure and its subsidiary overseas, both legally, in
terms of limited liability, and economically. Foreign subsidiaries will naturally
be directed, at least in part, from the corporate headquarters of the parent. The
forum of the domestic corporate parent is a suitable location for personal
jurisdiction over the subsidiary.
In applying the proposed exception to the Myanmar villagers’ suit against
Unocal for aiding and abetting serious crimes through its wholly-owned
subsidiary, the effect of this proposal becomes clear. This proposal allows a suit
against the subsidiaries directly for their role in the forced labor, rape, and
murder inflicted on the villagers.312 It would no longer be necessary to attempt
corporate veil-piercing or seek to tie the parent to alleged crimes. Instead, those
who committed or participated most closely in the crimes can be held
accountable for their actions.
CONCLUSION
The ATS has evolved throughout its history—from little use during its first
190 years, to becoming a popular tool to seek remedy for human rights
violations, to the severe limitations that the Supreme Court recently imposed.313
309
See Daimler, 571 U.S. 117; Goodyear, 564 U.S. 915. The Court held in Goodyear that “the exercise of
general jurisdiction was only appropriate when a corporation’s ‘affiliations with the state are so continuous and
systematic as to render them essentially at home in the forum State.’” Matthew H. Adler & Frank H. Griffin,
BNSF v. Tyrrell: The Other International Shoe Has Dropped, PEPPER HAMILTON LLP (June 7, 2017),
https://www.pepperlaw.com/publications/bnsf-v-tyrrell-the-other-international-shoe-has-dropped-2017-06-07/
(quoting Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 918).
310
Daimler, 571 U.S. 117 (suit was brought against a foreign parent for torts of a foreign subsidiary based
on the connection of a domestic U.S. subsidiary to the forum).
311
Id.
312
See Doe v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002).
313
Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386 (2018); Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 569 U.S. 108,
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While it is arguable that the United States should not become the world’s forum
for litigating human rights disputes that involve only foreign parties acting
abroad, when human rights abuses involve American interests, the United States
should be involved.314 The recent limitations on the ATS in Kiobel and Jesner
greatly limit the ability of foreign plaintiffs to find even U.S. corporations liable
for harms they might cause. The hurdles are even more difficult to overcome
when harms are caused by subsidiaries of U.S. corporations. U.S. corporations
derive significant benefits from their foreign subsidiaries, and much of the
money they earn flows back into the United States.315 Because of this, the United
States should not create a loophole that allows these subsidiaries to escape
liability for violations of international law. The proposed exception to hold
foreign subsidiaries liable under the Alien Tort Statute will close this loophole.
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